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While browsing the abstracts of a recent issue of Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis, a journal of the American Educational Researchers Associa-
tion, I came across a report in which statistical methods were used to “con-
trol for” such “confounding variables” as “teachers, schools, and classrooms”
(Pong & Pallas, 2001).
I had to read the abstract a few times, a little stunned by the fact that
there still exist educational researchers who regard teachers, classrooms,
and schools in such terms. It seemed like it had to be a parody, akin to a
spoof of social science research that circulated several years back in which
it was reported that a statistically significant correlation exists between ut-
terances of the phrase “Please pass the salt” and the behavior of “salt pas-
sage.”
Of course, not too many decades ago, studies rooted in statistical meth-
ods and assumptions were the rule of educational inquiry, not the excep-
tion. But that’s changed. Dramatically. Surveys of library stacks and cita-
tion indices reveal that interpretive and critical discourses have won the
day. And thankfully so. We know, deeply, that such nested and co-impli-
cated influences as teachers in classrooms in schools cannot be bracketed or
ignored in discussions of any aspect of formal education. That being said,
the success in exorcising statistical analysis seems to have had an unfortu-
nate side effect, namely concomitant rejections of scientific methods and
mathematics-based tools of interpretation.
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Before I go much further, I should emphasize that I’m not advocating
renewed embraces of the analytic method, rationalistic argument, or em-
piricist demonstrations around matters of learning, pedagogy, and curricu-
lum. My point is, rather, that the contemporary habit of demonizing science
as a mindless monolith is as problematic as the previous deification of ana-
lytic and statistical methods. That is, the tendency to couple “science” to
“statistics” is an error, and one that might now be hindering curriculum
studies when it could be supporting our efforts.
Just as there are many, many perspectives that might orient interpretive
inquiry, there is a diversity of scientific attitudes. One particularly useful
rubric for distinguishing among the varied interests and methods of sci-
ence was proposed by physicist Warren Weaver in 1948. He noted that mod-
ern science has evolved around at least three different categories of phe-
nomena, each of which lends itself to particular interpretive tools.
The first he called simple systems. These include collisions, orbits, ballis-
tics, and other events that involve only two or three well-defined objects
and their interactions—the sorts of events that are studied in high school
physics and that occupied the attentions of Galileo, Descartes, and New-
ton. Such phenomena are suited to the ideals of prediction and control,
through appropriate applications of the sorts of relatively simple and el-
egant mathematical laws that are presented in Newtonian mechanics.
However, Newton himself recognized that these systems of physical laws
can give rise to intractable calculations when the number of interacting
agents increases only slightly. Partially in response to this sort of realiza-
tion, by the early 1800s scientists borrowed from a new class of analytic
tools—probability and statistics—that mathematicians had invented to serve
the needs of business (specifically, for the construction of mortuary tables
for insurance companies). These tools were trained on phenomena that in-
volved thousands, millions, and more particles and variables. Examples of
complicated phenomena, Weaver’s second category,1  included flowing wa-
ter, chemical reactions, air movements, and games of chance. The new meth-
ods also supported the emergence of a “stochasticized” mindset, as terms
such as probably and likely took on new meanings and new prominence in
both scientific and popular discourse (Davis & Hersh, 1987).
That being said, probability and chance were understood as a veneer
that we humans, owing to our perceptual and conceptual limitations, were
compelled to impose on a universe believed to be certain and pre-scripted.
The underlying mentality was still deterministic, consistent with Pierre
Laplace’s pronouncement at the close of the 18th century:
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all forces by which
nature is animated and the respective situations of the beings which compose
it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analyses—it would
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embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies and those of
the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future as the past,
would be present to its eyes. (1795/1951, p. 3)
The move to probability and statistics, then, was in response to the realiza-
tion that no flesh-based intelligence was sufficiently vast. It was commen-
tary on the limits of humanity, not on the nature of the universe. There was
no questioning of the laws of mechanics or their appropriate application,
merely a resignation to the fact that increasingly complicated phenomena
made for decreasingly reliable characterizations.
In fact, far from representing a break from prior mindsets, the develop-
ment and embrace of probabilitistic and statistical models was an amplifi-
cation of modernist sensibilities. This point is perhaps most apparent in the
emergence of a discourse of normality—which was prompted and enabled
in the coupling of Darwinism and statistics in the mid-1800s. In the process
of dissolving the assumption that “creation” was static (actually, in dissolv-
ing the assumption of creation), Darwin proposed a mechanism that ac-
counted for the emergence of diversity. He recast variety as something that
was caused, not something that was pregiven. In the realm of the social
sciences, it suddenly made sense to measure difference, to define “normal”
in terms of arithmetic means, and to pathologize everything that “devi-
ated” from arbitrary zones of “average”.
With the 1900s came the gradual realization that these sorts of practices
might be problematic. In the “hard sciences,” this insight emerged in the
articulation of a previously unrecognized category of phenomena that
yielded neither to Newtonian mechanics nor to statistical analysis. These
instances of complexity, in Weaver’s terms, include brain function, stock
market activity, cultural evolution—in effect, phenomena that are dynami-
cally adaptive and that we tend to describe or regard as living systems. (I
might also mention that teachers, classrooms, and schools—and other phe-
nomena that some researchers continue to ignore and factor out as con-
founding variables—fall into this category.) Such forms sustain their exist-
ence in the ongoing generation of diverse possibilities, which means that
methods that seek to define universal rules or normal ranges of acceptabil-
ity are utterly inappropriate for their study.
Unfortunately, social science research had already dug itself into a statis-
tics-lined hole by the time proposals such as Weaver’s had begun to emerge
within the scientific establishment. And those who recognized social sci-
ence research to be in a rut tended to blame the imagined culprit of a uni-
fied and monolithic science rather than overzealous and uninformed re-
searchers for the problem. The critical point here is that the spread of statis-
tical methods among educational researchers, while enabled by science and
mathematics, was certainly not a proper reflection of those cultural projects.
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Rather, statistics-based educational research occurred in ignorance of sci-
ence and mathematics—an ignorance that was and is supported by schooled
versions of these discourse systems. The following commentaries, all from
prominent mathematicians, underscore this point:
[Some] psychologists and sociologists have come around with their question-
naires and chi-square statistics, purporting to study the human mind quantita-
tively, but most such investigations are so remote from the target that the critic
need hardly say, “Pooh!” They fall over of their own absurdity and pomposity.
(Davis & Hersh, 1987, p. 13)
The introduction of mathematical methods in biology, economics, psychology,
and other branches of the . . . behavioral sciences has always been accompanied
by controversy. . . . [It] is important to state publicly that among professional
mathematicians the skepticism about behavioral-science mathematics . . . is much
stronger than it is among non-mathematical behavioral scientists. (ibid., p. 61)
Too much research in the social sciences . . . is a mindless collection of . . . mean-
ingless data. If property X (say, humor) is defined in this way (number of laughs
elicited by a collection of jokes), and property Y (say, self-esteem) is defined in
that way (number of yes responses to a series of positive traits), then the corre-
lation coefficient between humor and self-esteem is .217. Worthless stuff. (Paulos,
1988, p. 161)
Stewart & Golubitsky (1992) (also mathematicians) offer one explanation
for the sorts of concerns announced above. In brief, they suggest that two
tools of interpretation have been inappropriately collapsed:
Linear models are based upon straight lines, flat planes, and constant growth
rates. Nonlinear models are based upon curves and variable growth rates. If,
like the classical mathematicians, you want to write down formulas that solve
your equations, then it’s best to stick to linear models. But, with computers and
new mathematical tools such as topology, formulas have taken a back seat. Non-
linear models are more interesting, and generally fit nature better. All too often
a nonlinear system has been forced into a linear mould (a round peg into a square
hole!) in order to obtain an answer. The philosophy behind this approach seems
to be that a wrong answer, or the right answer to the wrong question, is better
than no answer at all. (p. 171)
This important distinction between linear and nonlinear models roughly
parallels Weaver’s distinction between complicated systems (which tend to
be mechanical, and hence predictable in general terms) and organized com-
plexity (which tends more toward the organic). Indeed, another name for
complexity science is nonlinear dynamics.
What’s important here is that science and mathematics have developed
tools that are valuable for understanding complex phenomena like learn-
ing and learners—and part of this development has been a shift in what is
meant by “understanding a phenomenon.” For a complex event, such un-
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derstanding is not about control and prediction, but about the capacities to
follow the ongoing evolutions of a form or agent and to make sense of its
emergent structures. Within these sorts of interpretive projects, mathemat-
ics and science have taken on a role that is different from what the original
rationalists and empiricists imagined. The aim now is more about the de-
velopment of useful descriptions and illustrations than about the produc-
tion of explanatory principles.
I’ve found it necessary to resist the temptation to provide hasty summa-
ries of such the descriptions and illustrations. Unfortunately, just like Dar-
winian processes and statistical methods when they were first introduced,
complexity science lends itself to misinterpretation and misappropriation
in the hands of persons working from a prior mindset. To appreciate com-
plexity, one must first learn to live with/in a few rather radical breaks with
accepted wisdom. One is the idea of “order for free,” whereby complex and
transcendent unities can arise in the co-specifying activities of seemingly
autonomous entities. Ants spontaneously self-organize into anthills, birds
into flocks, traders into markets, species into ecosystems, and so on. (This is
where complexivists tend to lose modernists, with their insistence on au-
tonomous, self-contained subjects.) And it all happens without leaders or
intentions. (This is where complexivists tend to part company with those
postmodernists who are committed to the metaphor of “power” as a prop-
erty of and motivator in the evolution of systems.)
Closely related to this dynamic of self-organization is the suggestion that
the human being might be better considered in terms of an agent that is
nested within several different sorts of grander social and/or cultural agents.
I am, simultaneously, a learning unity, a collective of learning unities, and a
subunit of many different learning unities—a suggestion that renders prob-
lematic both sides of such contemporary educational debates as teacher-
versus student-centered classrooms, nature versus nurture, individual ver-
sus social interests, and so on. Complexity science is a science of entangle-
ment, not of distinction-making. It is about participation, not specification.
An important caveat of this sort of discussion is that a complex phenom-
enon is irreducible. It transcends its parts, and so cannot be studied strictly
in terms of a compilation of those parts. It must be studied, that is, at the
level of its emergence. Classrooms aren’t just collections of students, schools
aren’t just collections of classrooms. As such, complexity science provides a
means to read across cognitive, social, situated, critical, cultural, and eco-
logical discourses—without collapsing them or their particular foci into
unitary or coherent phenomena. According to complexity science, such dis-
courses can be simultaneously appropriate to their object of study and in-
compatible with one another. We don’t need to agree to be correct.
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Further to this point, one of the reasons that complexity science is useful
for reading across diverse discourses is that it explicitly embraces many of
the insights and sensibilities that arose over the past century in such fields
as phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and pragmatism. This is a topic that I
develop in detail elsewhere (Davis, forthcoming) in an extended discussion
of the evolutions of Western conceptions of teaching away from discourses
that are rooted in metaphysics and toward interpretations that are grounded
in the physical. Consider, for example, the opening three lines of Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1999) Philosophy in the Flesh, a text out of cognitive science that is
explicitly informed by complexity science:
The mind is inherently embodied.
Thought is mostly unconscious.
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. (p. 3)
The first line hints at Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the second reminds
of Freud’s psychoanalysis, the third recalls Dewey’s pragmatism. What’s
more is that complexity science is not just interested in describing complex
phenomena. It joins with psychoanalysis as one of the few Western dis-
courses with an explicit interest in articulating what might be described as
a pragmatics of transformation. Complexivists, that is, are as much interested
in occasioning complexity and triggering transformations as they are in
studying existing instances of complexity. Two of the conditions that are
necessary have been deliberately incorporated into the structure of this in-
augural issue of the Journal of the Canadian Association for Curriculum Stud-
ies—namely, diversity among parts and the juxtaposition of that diversity
in ways that might trigger new individual and/or collective possibilities.
These same sorts of conditions can be deliberately woven into classrooms,
but almost never are. Education hasn’t paid much attention to this particu-
lar pragmatics of transformation—unlike business, economics, politics, eth-
ics, law, and several branches of medicine, including immunology and neu-
rology. I suspect that part of the reason for the slow uptake among educa-
tionalists has to do with the overwhelming commitment to linearity and
linear causality, inscribed in institutional structures, classroom resources,
developmentalist theories, curriculum intentions, and pedagogical meth-
ods. It may be that, until we are collectively willing to face the prospect that
the formal educational project is deeply problematic, complexity science
must be relegated to that class of educationally unbearable discourses that
includes (among its many honorable members) psychoanalysis,  pragma-
tism, and poststructuralism.
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Note
1 Weaver actually used the term “disorganized complexity” to refer to his second cat-
egory. “Complicated” is the preferred word at the moment for this class of phenomena.
See Waldrop (1992).
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